A modern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on the ‡ow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which, in turn, is routed towards other downstream units. In this essay, I argue that this network perpective on production linkages can o¤er novel insights on the sources of aggregate ‡uctuations.
Introduction
A modern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on the ‡ow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output which, in turn, is routed towards other downstream units. In this essay I argue that the structure of this production network is key in determining whether and how microeconomic shocks -a¤ecting only a particular …rm or technology along the chain -propagate throughout the economy and shape aggregate outcomes. For this reason, understanding the structure of this production network can better inform both academics on the origins of aggregate ‡uctuations and policy-makers on how to prepare for and recover from adverse shocks that disrupt these production chains.
Two recent events have brought to the forefront the importance of interconnections between …rms and sectors in aggregate economic performance. Consider …rst the 2011 earthquake in Japan. While the triple tragedy of the earthquake, the ensuing tsunami and the near nuclear meltdown at Fukushima surely resulted in a signi…cant destruction of human and physical capital, its e¤ects would have been largely restricted to the a¤ected areas were it not for the disruption of national and global supply chains that it entailed. As Kim and Reynolds (2011) reported for Reuters in the aftermath of the earthquake:
"Supply chain disruptions in Japan have forced at least one global automaker to delay the launch of two new models and are forcing other industries to shutter plants (. . . ) The automaker is just one of dozens, if not hundreds, of Japanese manufacturers facing disruptions to their supply chains as a result of the quake, the subsequent tsunami and a still-unresolved nuclear threat."
On a grander scale, the …nancial crisis, the 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, have brought with them a renewed emphasis on the complex web of linkages which constitute the backbone of the U.S. economy. Terms like "too interconnected to fail"or "systemically important …rms"have become commonplace in public discourse. While this network lingo originated in the con…nes of an intertwined …nancial sector, it is increasingly used to describe the transmission of disturbances across individual actors in the economy. One prime example is the reasoning o¤ered in the congressional testimony of Ford's C.E.O., Alan Mullaly (2008) , when requesting the government to bail out Ford's key competitors, G.M. and Chrysler:
"If any one of the domestic companies should fail, we believe there is a strong chance that the entire industry would face severe disruption. Ours is in some significant ways an industry that is uniquely interdependent -particularly with respect to our supply base, with more than 90 percent commonality among our suppliers.
Should one of the other domestic companies declare bankruptcy, the e¤ect on Ford's production operations would be felt within days -if not hours. Suppliers could not get …nancing and would stop shipments to customers. Without parts for the just-intime inventory system, Ford plants would not be able to produce vehicles." (Mullaly, 2008)
The common theme across these two examples is that the organization of production along supply chain networks exposes the aggregate economy to disruptions in critical nodes in these chains. In particular, whenever the linkage structure in the economy is dominated by a small number of hubs-supplying inputs to many di¤erent …rms or sectors-aggregate ‡uctuations may obtain for two related, but distinct, reasons. First, ‡uctuations in these hub-like production units can propagate throughout the economy and a¤ect aggregate performance, much in the same way as a shutdown at a major airport has a disruptive impact on all scheduled ‡ights throughout a country. In either case, there are no close substitutes in the short run and every user is a¤ected by disturbances at the source. Second, the presence of these hubs provides shortcuts through which these supply chain networks become easily navigable. That is, hubs shorten distances between otherwise disparate parts of the economy that do not directly trade inputs. The upshot of this is that these production hubs act as powerful shock conductors, helping to transmit shocks originating elsewhere in the network.
In this essay, I argue that these production networks, by facilitating the propagation of otherwise localized disturbances, provide a bridge between the micro -the myriad of unforeseen events a¤ecting individual production decisions -and the macro -their synchronized behaviour which de…nes the business cycle.
This synchronization of production decisions over time has led most of modern macroeconomics to assume the presence of some sort of aggregate shock, at times lifting all boats, at times generating widespread recessions. In doing so however, modern business cycle theory has assumed -rather than explained -comovement across producers from the outset. Moreover, after decades of research, the origins of these aggregate shocks remain elusive thus casting doubt on their assumed existence. Against this backdrop, the promise of production networks is to open the black-box of comovement by viewing it as the endogenous outcome of micro shocks propagating across input linkages.
To do this, I will begin by showing how this novel view can be easily mapped to a standard multi-sector general equilibrium setting where di¤erent sectors are interlinked by input-output relations. In particular, through a series of stylized examples, I will explore how the propagation of sectoral shocks -and hence aggregate volatility -depends on di¤erent arrangements of production, i.e. di¤erent 'shapes'of the underlying production network.
The natural follow-up question that I take on in this paper is whether we can discipline the set of admissible 'shapes'by looking at actual data on production networks. I will do this by exploring -from a network perspective -the empirical properties of a large scale production network as given by U.S. detailed input-output data.
Given the properties we observe in the data, I then use the model to ask a range of questions:
Is the organization of the economy along production networks a source of aggregate ‡uctuations?
Can we understand empirical patterns of sectoral comovement through this lens? Is the level of sectoral comovement a function of how far apart the di¤erent sectors are in the production network? Do central sectors in the production network comove more with the aggregate? In short, can traditional tools of network analysis -such as distance across nodes or centrality of a given node -help us further our understanding of what shapes comovement?
Finally, I show that the structure of the production network -and the strength of the propagation mechanism it entails -is crucial when confronting a deep-seated and in ‡uential logic which, till this day, justi…es the continued appeal to an exogenous synchronization device, in the form of aggregate shocks. This argument, dating back at least to Lucas (1977) , goes as follows: given that uncorrelated micro disturbances, by de…nition, occur randomly across production nodes, won't these micro-shocks tend to average out as we disaggregate the economy into …ner and …ner de…nitions of what a production unit is? In other words, won't these local disturbances tend to be diversi…ed away? In turn, doesn't this imply that we cannot dispense with aggregate shocks? By bringing theory and empirics together I will argue that the answer to these questions is a likely "no".
A simple model of production networks
I start by showing how these production networks can be mapped into a basic general equilibrium setting -a static variant of a textbook multi-sector model without aggregate shocks, following closely in the footsteps of Acemoglu et al. (2012) . I then discuss how di¤erent ways of organizing these production networks can generate di¤erent magnitudes of aggregate volatility.
Networks of input ‡ows: a general equilibrium benchmark
Consider an economy where production takes place at n distinct nodes, each specializing in a di¤erent good. These goods serve a dual role in the economy: on the one hand, each good is potentially valued by households as …nal consumption; on the other hand, the very same good can be used as an intermediate input to be deployed in the production of other goods. Here I will focus on this latter role and simplify the …nal demand side of this economy substantially by assuming that households value the di¤erent goods equally and, as a consequence, consume them in equal proportions. In the same spirit, I will assume households provide labor services inelastically to the goods'producers in the economy and spend all the resulting wage income in the consumption of the n goods. 1 A natural interpretation for these production nodes is to equate them with the di¤erent sectors of an economy. I assume that the production process at each of these sectors is well approximated by a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, combining a primary factor -which in this case is labor -and intermediate inputs. The output of sector i is then given by:
!
In this Cobb-Douglas production function, the …rst term shows the contribution from primary factors to production. The amount of labor hired by sector i is given by l i , while 1 is the share of labor in production. The added element in this …rst term is z i , a sector-speci…c productivity disturbance, shifting the production possibilities frontier of sector i in a random fashion.
This is the only source of uncertainty in this simple economy. I assume further that these productivity shocks are independent across producers of goods in the economy. The absence of any exogenous correlating device-that is, the lack of any aggregate technology shocks-allows us to focus solely on the question of interest: can interconnections across production technologies, in the form of intermediate inputs ‡ows, generate endogenous comovement across otherwise unrelated producers of goods?
These interconnections between production nodes come into play with the second term of the production function, which re ‡ects the contribution of intermediate inputs from other sectors.
Thus, the term x ij denotes the amount of good j used in the production of good i. The exponent between two sectors and (iii) a collection of weights, each of which is associated with a particular directed edge and given by the exponent ! ij in the production function.
The question is now whether di¤erent production networks, i.e. di¤erent arrangements of who sources inputs from whom, matter for comovement and aggregate ‡uctuations. An initial clue is provided by the general equilibrium solution of the economy just described. In equilibrium, (the logarithm of) aggregate value added, y, is simply a weighted sum of the (logarithm of) micro-level productivity shocks, " i : 2 I will further assume that these shares sum to one for any sector i. As a consequence of the Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale, assumption and competitive factor markets, these shares are constant over time. Anticipating the discussion below, they can be read o¤ the entries of input-output tables, measuring the value of spending on input j as a share of total intermediate input purchases of sector i. 3 Additionally, it should be stressed that by imposing a convenient, but nevertheless particular, Cobb-Douglas structure to aggregate across intermediate inputs, I am also imposing a unit elasticity of substitution across inputs. In reality, for any given technology, there will be some inputs that are crucial and di¢ cult to substitute away from, even if their price rises substantially -think fresh …sh for sushi restaurants in Japan in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster and the ensuing contamination scare -while others would seem more substitutable -advertising seems like a prime example. Unfortunately, at least at very disaggregated levels, we have little evidence regarding the likely range of these elasticities. At intermediate levels of aggregation -e.g. two digit industries -Atalay (2014) provides evidence in favour of strong complementarity across intermediate inputs.
where the weights, v i , are determined by the production network, W 4 . This characterization has two important consequences: …rst, aggregate output is itself random, i.e. we now have a simple theory of why aggregate output might ‡uctuate over time; second, the magnitude of these aggregate ‡uctuations can now be traced back to the production network, in particular, how strongly the underlying network propagates micro-shocks across sectors, as encoded by the weights v i .
To understand the speci…c propagation mechanism at play in this setting, it is perhaps useful to go through a simple thought experiment. Imagine that a favourable productivity shock hits one sector in the economy leaving the productivity of all others unchanged. To be concrete, think for example of a major, unanticipated, breakthrough in the production technology of semiconductors which decreases the marginal cost of production signi…cantly. Clearly, this supply shock will increase the production and decrease the price of semiconductors. As a result of this shock, the electronic components sector -the key sector downstream of semiconductorsalso sees its marginal cost decline as one of its key inputs just became cheaper. Electronic component producers will react to this by expanding production and decreasing their own price. A second round of adjustment now ensues as the many sectors downstream of electronic components -computers, precision machines or communication devices among many others -adjust in the same way. As the original shock percolates further through the production network, a cascade of adjustments is now under way. Ultimately, every sector that is -directly or indirectly -downstream of semiconductors will …nd it optimal to increase production by some amount, potentially leading to a synchronized expansion of economic activity across the board. 4 The competitive equilibrium solution of this basic model economy yields an expression for the logarithm of aggregate value added (i.e. GDP), y, given by:
where 1 is a n 1 vector of ones and " is a n 1 vector of the (logarithm of) sector speci…c productivity shocks, that is, " i log(z i ). Aggregate GDP, y, is a weighted sum of the underlying micro shocks and hence a random variable itself. The n 1 vector v gives the appropriate weight to each sector. When a productivity shock hits a given sector, all of the adjustments described in the main text are encapsulated in the term [I W 0] 1 . The latter object is nothing other than the celebrated "Leontief inverse" matrix of input-output analysis. Notice that an outside observer focusing solely on aggregate measurements of the economy and ignoring the structure of intermediate input trade would conclude that a mysterious aggregate productivity shock had just occurred, the source of which would necessarily be elusive.
In fact, only one of the many production technologies in this economy is now more productive. The comovement induced by this idiosyncratic shock is a feature of general equilibrium adjustments working their way through the network of input linkages.
Three Variations on a Theme: Network Structure Matters
These cascading e¤ects via input-output linkages open the door to thinking about comovement across sectors and aggregate ‡uctuations without resorting to aggregate shocks. But whether and how an idiosyncratic shock propagates across the economy via these linkages depends critically on the way the production network is arranged.
To understand how the structure of production networks can matter for the volatility of aggregate output I now show that di¤erent production networks imply di¤erent levels for the volatility of aggregate output. Speci…cally, I explore three variations on a four node economy, by considering three di¤erent arrangements of an underlying production network, as depicted in Figure 1 . Each of these networks will imply a di¤erent strength for the model's internal propagation mechanism. These can be summarized by what I will call a network multiplier: by how much the particular network structure of the economy ampli…es idiosyncratic volatility. and a single sink (the downstream node, with no outgoing links). 6 Just as in the horizontal economy, shocks to each sector's productivity growth have a direct contribution to aggregate output and hence on aggregate volatility. But because sectors are now interlinked, further indirect contributions to aggregate volatility arise. For example, productivity ‡uctuations at the most upstream source (sector 1) to now have a …rst-round e¤ect on its immediate downstream customer sector 2; a smaller, second-round e¤ect on sector 3; and an even smaller, third round, e¤ect on sector 4. The remaining three sectors contribute in a similar manner except for the fact that they are closer to the sink node and hence do not contribute to aggregate volatility with as many higher order indirect e¤ects. Taken together, the presence of these indirect e¤ects - 5 In the horizontal economy, equilibrium aggregate output is given by y =
(1 ) n n (i=1) " i (using the equation from the previous footnote). Given that, by assumption, there is no correlation in the productivity shocks across technologies, the variance of aggregate output is simply
4 m H , where m H , the network multiplier associated to the horizontal economy, is equal to 1. In the vertical economy, aggregate output volatility is now given by 
. Clearly m V > m H for any positive share of intermediate inputs.
Aggregate output volatility in the star economy is equal to While necessarily stylized, this star economy captures an important feature of the input-output data I analyse below, where general purpose inputs -real estate and construction, banking and …nance, energy sectors or various forms of information technologies -emerge as hubs in the production network. Perhaps not surprisingly, this particular shape of the production network yields the highest volatility across the three example economies just described, i.e. the associated network multiplier m S > m V > m H . This heightened volatility comes from two sources. First, productivity ‡uctuations in the hub sector now have a direct, …rst-round, impact on every sector in the economy. Second, despite the fact that the remaining technologies are now peripheral, ‡uctuations in these sectors now propagate to all other sectors, as a second-order e¤ect through their e¤ect on the hub sector. Thus, hub technologies contribute to aggregate volatility in two ways. First, and similarly to the source nodes in the vertical economy, hub sectors act as an important source of shocks. However, in this star economy, a new role emerges: hub sectors act also as an important conductor of shocks occurring elsewhere in the economy.
These three examples demonstrate the possibility that the particular shape of the production network may have a bearing on aggregate volatility. But these are just a few out of the many con…gurations possible, even in a highly stylized economy with only four nodes. What happens when we take the number of nodes to be very large? How are we to choose among this rich menu of possibilities? How can we summarize the relevant features of these production networks in data? To make progress on these questions, it is necessary to take this network perspective to data on disaggregated input ‡ows.
Mapping production networks to data
The empirical counterpart to a network of production technologies consisting of nodes that represent di¤erent sectors and directed ‡ows that capture input transactions between sectors is given by input-output data. To investigate the network structure of sector-to-sector input ‡ows, this network. Thus, a …rst-order characterization of this network is its sparsity or low density 8 : there are only 5217 non-zero edges out of a possible 417 2 , yielding a network density of 0.03.
To put it another way: at this level of disaggregation, most sectors consist of very specialized technologies that only supply inputs to a handful of other sectors. As a result, the number of sectors supplied by the average sector-that is, the average "degree" of this network-is relatively low at about 11 relative to the total number of sectors in the network.
The Small World of Production Networks
Looking more closely at the …gure, another …rst-order feature emerges: there is extensive heterogeneity across sectors in their role as input suppliers. In the data, highly specialized input suppliers coexist alongside general purpose input suppliers, such as iron and steel mills, petroleum re…neries or real estate, some of the hub-like sectors in Figure 2 .
This heterogeneity along the input-supply margin can be conveniently summarized by looking at another network object, its weighted outdegree distribution. De…ne the weighted outdegree of a sector as d x-axis is the weighted outdegree for each sector, presented on a log scale. The y-axis (also in log scale) gives the probability that a sector selected at random from the population has an outdegree larger than or equal to x. Thus, the upper left-hand portion of the distribution -where specialized technologies like optical lens manufacturing are located -shows that about 100 percent of sectors have a weighted outdegree greater than 0.01; the middle portion of the distribution shows that only about one-tenth of all sectors have an outdegree greater than 1; and the right-hand side of the distribution -where we …nd general purpose technologies like iron and steel mills or petroleum re…neries -shows that only about 1 percent of all sectors have a weighted outdegree measure greater than 5.
Clearly, the empirical distribution of weighted outdegree measures is skewed and spans several orders of magnitude, re ‡ecting the very unequal status of di¤erent technologies in their role as input suppliers. As in other instances where extreme inequality is …rst order -e.g. the cross-section of incomes, city or …rm sizes -the right tail of this distribution is well approximated by a so-called power law distribution. This kind of distribution implies a strong fat-tailed behaviour in that the probability of …nding superstar technologies, far out in the right tail, is large enough to render the variance of this distribution in…nite. 9 The upshot of this is that, even as we disaggregate the economy into …ner and …ner de…nitions of technologies, large input-supplying sectors do not vanish.
The presence of this small number of hub-like sectors renders these input-output networks into small and closely knitted worlds. In other words, despite the low density of sectoral interactions-despite the fact that most sectors do not trade with each other-each sector is only a few input-supply links away from most other sectors. In network parlance, these types of networks are referred to as "small world networks" in which most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but where most nodes can be reached from every other by a small number of 9 The apparent linearity in the tail of the outdegree distribution when shown in log scales is usually associated with a power law distribution. We say that the outdegree distribution follows a power-law if the associated counter-cumulative probability distribution P (x)-giving the probability of …nding sectors with outdegree equal to or greater than x-is given by:
where c is a positive constant and is known as the tail index. A well-known property of this distribution is that for 1 < < 2, the outdegree distribution has diverging second (and above) moments. The straight line in Figure 3 shows the maximum likelihood …t implied by = 1:44. See Gabaix (2009) for a review of power laws and their applications in economics.
hops or steps along the directed edges.
More precisely, in the network literature, small worlds are de…ned by appealing to two related statistics: (i) the diameter of the network, de…ned as the maximum length of the shortest path, i.e. the largest number of steps that separate sector i from sector j for all possible pairs of sectors (i; j) and (ii) the average distance, de…ned as the average length of these shortest paths for all pairs (i; j). When I apply these statistics to the detailed input-output data, I obtain a low diameter (relative to 417, the total number of sectors) of 10 and a small average distance of 4, thus con…rming the small world nature of the U.S. production network.
The small-world property has obvious implications for the dynamics of processes taking place on networks. In the context of social networks, if it takes only six steps for a rumor to spread from any person to any other in society, then a rumor will likely spread much faster than if it takes 100 steps. Similarly, as I will argue further below, if one considers the e¤ect of a production disturbance, shutdown or default, to a speci…c …rm or technology, the smallworld e¤ect implies that the original shock will spread quickly to most sectors thus a¤ecting the performance of the aggregate economy.
Searching for Central Nodes in the Production Network
Until now I have focused attention on key technologies as de…ned by their weighted outdegree ranking. These superstar technologies are certainly important both as a sources of volatility and when propagating shocks occurring in other sectors. However, a sector can be key in other ways. For example, consider a sector that looks average by its weighted outdegree ranking, but that nevertheless is a key input supplier to a widely used general purpose technology. Despite the fact that the immediate customers downstream of this sector are few, indirectly-through the downstream hub-many production processes can potentially be a¤ected by disturbances in the specialized upstream node. 10 Identifying the central input-supplying technologies and ranking their roles in an economy requires applying an appropriate measure of "node centrality"to the production network. While network analysis has developed a variety of centrality measures, here I will focus on so-called it have been deployed in the sociology literature, notably Bonacich (1972) and Katz (1953) , in computer science with Google's PageRank algorithm (Brin and Page 1998), or in social networks literature within economics (for example, Ballester et al. 2006 ). In our setting the Katz-Bonacich measure assigns, to each sector, a centrality score that is the sum of some baseline centrality level (equal across sectors), and the centrality score of each of its downstream sectors, de…ned in the same way. 11 Thus, as in the example above, a sector's centrality need not be dictated by its outdegree alone, but will also be determined by its customers' outdegree, its customers'customers'outdegree, ad in…nitum.
Remarkably, the sector-centrality scores obtained in this way coincide, exactly, with the 11 To derive the Katz-Bonacich eigenvector centrality measure in our setting consider assigning, to each sector j, a centrality weight c j > 0, which is de…ned by some baseline centrality level , equal across all sectors, plus a term which is proportional to the weighted sum of the centrality weights of its downstream sectors: c j = i W ij c i + , for some parameter > 0. In matrix form, c = W 0c + 1, where W is the matrix representation of our production network, 1 is a vector of ones, and c is the vector of centrality scores, c j s. This implies that the vector of centralities is given by:
Recalling the expression for equilibrium log GDP in the basic model, the vector c is nothing but the vector of Katz-Bonacich centralities given an input-output network W where we restrict = 1 n , = (and where was the share of intermediate inputs in production). sector-speci…c weights, i , appearing in the expression for equilibrium aggregate output obtained in the previous section. As a result, aggregate growth and volatility in our simple multisector model now depends on a well-de…ned network object: the collection of network centralities of the di¤erent production technologies. Intuitively, more central production technologies in the production network -those having more direct or indirect downstream customers -are relatively more important in determining aggregate volatility.
On the x-axis is the (Bonacich) measure of centrality of sectors in the 2002 input-output data. The y-axis gives probability of …nding a sector with centrality score larger than or equal to x. Thus, 100 percent of the sectors have a centrality measure that is greater than or equal to the most peripheral node in the network -hunting and trapping -with a centrality score of 0.001; about 10 percent of the sectors in the network have a centrality measure greater than 0.004, that of warehousing and storage; and only about 1 percent have a centrality measure greater 0.01, that of truck transportation.
As in the outdegree distribution, there is large variation in the network centrality of di¤erent nodes, again in the form of a power-law distribution. 12 Far out in the right tail, we …nd the central production nodes in the network. Through the lenses of our model, sectors such as real estate, management of companies and enterprises, advertising, wholesale trade, telecommunications, iron and steel mills, truck transportation, and depository credit intermediation alongside a variety of energy related sectors -petroleum re…neries, oil and gas extraction and electric power generation and distribution -are seemingly key to US aggregate volatility as they sit at the center of the production network. 
Networked Perspectives on Comovement
Comovement across sectors is the hallmark of cyclical ‡uctuations. As stressed throughout this essay, from a production networks perspective, comovement is endogenous: synchronization arises from micro shocks propagating across input linkages. Importantly, this perspective also implies that a very particular pattern of comovement should hold in the data. To see this note that, as an original sectoral shock to productivity makes its way downstream, its e¤ect should weaken. Intuitively, a shock generating a given response in the output and price of the original input-supplying sector will generate more muted responses further downstream as that input is a smaller part of the total input bill of these sectors. Thus, two sectors which are closer in terms of their network distance should comove more. 14 In Figure 5 , the x-axis gives the network distance across any pair of sectors. The y-axis gives the average correlation of sectoral output growth across all sector pairs'at a given distance in the production network. Clearly, sectors that are closer in the production network do comove more.
Across all pairs of sectors that directly trade inputs, the average annual growth rate correlation is 0.32. Conversely, for pairs of sectors that are very distant in the network, the average correlation is only around 0.1. Another way to relate network distance and comovement is to look at averages in the population. Across all sector pairs, the average growth rate correlation in the data is 0.21. This is strikingly close to the average growth rate correlation between sectors that are four links away, the average distance in the network.
From the vantage point of production networks this is no coincidence: the average level of sectoral comovement in the data -and hence aggregate volatility -is in fact implied by a short average distance in our small world of production networks. Were the production network to be arranged in some other way -thus altering its shock conducting properties -the average level of comovement would change accordingly.
Note that it would be very di¢ cult to rationalize this feature of comovement across sectors in a setup with aggregate shocks alone. First, were all sectors to respond equally to some exogenous aggregate pulse, Figure 5 should simply display a horizontal line, i.e. comovement should not vary systematically with network distance. Alternatively, if we were to assume that sectors have di¤erent sensitivities to this aggregate shock, the only way to generate a similar pattern to the one observed in the data would be to impose in addition a condition that sectors tend to source inputs from similarly sensitive sectors. It is unclear what could justify this very strong assumption. In contrast, the empirical relation between comovement and network distance observed in the data is an immediate implication of our standard general equilibrium model of production networks.
As argued earlier, low average distances between sectors are a consequence of hubs-that is, the existence of general purpose inputs that shorten the path between otherwise disparate technologies. These hubs are, by de…nition, central nodes in the production network, only a short distance away from the majority of sectors. As such, by the same network distance- I again resort to the NBER manufacturing data and to the 1987 input-output data to assess the validity of this prediction. I use the former to aggregate sectoral growth rates and derive a time series of aggregate manufacturing real growth in value added. I use the input-output data to calculate the measure of (Bonacich) network centrality -discussed in the previous sectionfor each manufacturing sector. 15 As a proxy for productivity ‡uctuations occurring in central nodes, I take the simple average of total factor productivity growth across the ten most central sectors in the production network. Several concerns can be raised about this calculation. First, perhaps causality runs the other way: not from key sectors to aggregate economic performance as a networked perspective implies, but instead from aggregate shocks a¤ecting key sectors disproportionately. For this to be the case, productivity in relatively more central technologies would need to be more cyclically sensitive. While it is a priori unclear why "cyclical sensitivity" should correlate with this very particular and non-obvious network centrality measure, this identi…cation problem has not been conclusively dealt with in the literature.
An alternative critique is that this correlation simply re ‡ects an underlying accounting identity and contains no economic meaning beyond that. After all, high centrality sectors are likely among the larger sectors in the economy. Hence movements in economic activity in these large sectors, for which productivity might be acting as a proxy, would mechanically translate into movement in aggregates. If this critique is valid, were we to remove the contribution of these key sectors to aggregate growth, we should then observe a much lower correlation between productivity growth in high centrality nodes and aggregate output growth. This can be easily tested by constructing a counterfactual aggregate manufacturing output growth series where we zero out the contribution of the ten most central technologies. Reassuringly, the correlation between this counterfactual aggregate series and our index of productivity ‡uctuations in these ten most central technologies is still a very high 0.76. This is consistent with our network perspective: hub sectors are important sources of aggregate ‡uctuations not because they are large but because they synchronize economic activity across the board.
Confronting Lucas'(other) Critique
While promising as a way to understand the origins of comovement and aggregate ‡uctuations, a skeptic might still reasonably argue that all the intuition and results above are just a …gment of aggregation. Surely, as we disaggregate the economy into …ner and …ner sectors, independent disturbances across nodes will tend to average out, leaving aggregates unchanged thus yielding a weak propagation mechanism. In fact, this "diversi…cation" argument has a distinguished pedigree in macroeconomics and was invoked, for example, by Lucas (1977) to do away with the entire outlook proposed in these pages:
"In a complex modern economy, there will be a large number of such shifts in any given period, each small in importance relative to total output. There will be much "averaging out" of such e¤ects across markets. Cancellation of this sort is, I
think, the most important reason why one cannot seek an explanation of the general movements we call business cycles in the mere presence, per se, of unpredictability of conditions in individual markets."
This intuitive yet powerful indictment has been playing out over the years in the modern equilibrium business cycle literature and underlies much of its continued appeal to aggregate taste shifters or technology shocks. Can a production network perspective undo this argument?
How does aggregate volatility behave when we take the number of nodes in the production network to be very large -as it surely is in the economy -while keeping the assumption of no aggregate shocks?
We can certainly recreate Lucas'"diversi…cation" argument in our networked economy. To see it at play, recall the horizontal economy example introduced above. From that discussion it is immediate that, for a generic number of sectors, n, aggregate volatility in horizontal economies, y is of the order of magnitude of
. That is, as we disaggregate the horizontal economy further, into more and more production nodes, aggregate volatility declines to zero at very rapid rate of p n. This implies that, holding micro-volatility ( " ) …xed, as we move from an economy populated by 100 sectors to one with, say, 10000 sectors, the implied standard deviation of aggregate GDP will be an order of magnitude lower.
However, the network perspective on input ‡ow data renders clear what is wrong with this argument: the U.S. economy looks nothing like a horizontal economy where intermediate input producers exist in isolation of each other. Instead, the production of each good in the economy relies on a complex set of linkages across sectors. As we have seen these linkages function as a potential propagation mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks throughout the economy. How strong is this propagation mechanism once we take on board empirical properties of production networks? How strong is the multiplier associated with the actual U.S. production network?
To answer this question we need two ingredients. First, recall that generically the aggregate volatility is a function of the centrality scores of the di¤erent technologies in the U.S. production network. Second, as we have seen, there is extensive heterogeneity in these centrality scores: a relatively small number of hub-like sectors are far more central than the vast majority of nodes in the production network. Based on these two observations, it is possible to show 16 that, for empirically relevant production networks, aggregate volatility is of the order of magnitude of
, where is nothing else than the slope of the centrality score distribution in Figure 4 . This parameter governs the degree of "inequality" in this distribution: the more unequal is this distribution -i.e. the more important is the role of a few central input-suppliers in the network -the closer is to 1. The upshot of this is that, in a world where superstar technologies act as powerful shock conductors, aggregate volatility decays much more slowly with the number of sectors, rendering Lucas'diversi…cation arguments second order.
To understand the power of this seemingly abstruse distinction, consider the following backof-the-envelope calculation. From the NBER manufacturing data, the standard deviation of total factor productivity growth for a typical narrowly de…ned sector is 0.06. For, say, 500 sectors, the horizontal economy would then imply aggregate volatility of the order of magnitude of 0.003, a non-starter as a theory of the aggregate business cycle as Lucas had argued. Instead,
given the estimates for = 1:4 in Section 3, our theory of production networks now implies nonnegligible aggregate volatility of the order of 0.01. In a nutshell, sizeable aggregate ‡uctuations may originate from microeconomic shocks once salient characteristics of the production network are incorporated into the analysis.
Taken together, the networked structure of production is consistent with distinctive patterns of comovement in the data and opens the way for a deeper understanding of the sources of aggregate ‡uctuations without resorting to convenient, but ultimately elusive, aggregate shocks.
17 16 Under the assumption of idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate volatility in our simple model of production networks is given by:
i ) where i is the centrality of node i in the production network. Based on a power law distribution of centrality scores, it is possible to show, by applying Gabaix's (2011) theorem (on the asymptotic behaviour of sums of independent random variables with power law weights) that, for the empirically relevant fat-tailed regime (1 < < 2) aggregate volatility is of the order of magnitude of " n 1 1=" rather than " p n . 17 These conclusions are related to and reinforce the results of an earlier strand of the literature on cascading behavior in production networks. One of the early papers is due to Bak, Chen, Scheinkman and Woodford (1993) where the authors describe the distribution of production avalanches triggered by random independent demand events. See also Jovanovic (1987) for a notable antecedent to this line of research and La'O (2013) for a thought provoking follow-up. These di¤erent contributions are not based on an empirical description of the network structure, but instead assume very simple interaction structures across agents, such as circle networks or periodic lattices.
Viewing the economy as a complex production network may seem, at least at …rst hearing, as yet another fuzzy analogy coated in big words. In this essay, I have attempted to show that this perspective can indeed o¤er testable hypotheses and insights by mapping it to a standard general equilibrium setup and showing how this provides guidance for empirical explorations of input-output data. Looking at sectoral comovement from this vantage point, I have shown that the immediate implications of this networked perspective cannot be reasonably refuted.
Furthermore, as I have discussed, theory and empirics together provide a challenge to a long standing "irrelevance" indictment in the literature. To go beyond these suggestive possibility results, a small but fast expanding literature on production networks is hard at work on a number of important challenges. 
